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Emerging diseasesdthe monkeypox epidemic in the Democratic Republic
of the CongoAlmost 200 years after Edward Jenner's hallmark studies on
smallpox immunization and nearly 40 years after the global eradi-
cation of the disease by mass vaccination in 1977, the world faces
the emergence of another orthopoxvirus infection, monkeypox.
The disease was first discovered in 1970 in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC). Since then, the majority of cases continue to be re-
ported from the DRC [1e3], yet cases have also been reported from
neighbouring Republic of Congo [4] and, in 2006, a cluster from
Sudan [5]. In 2003, an outbreak of 47 cases emerged in the Mid-
western USA [2,6]. The virus originated from importedWest African
rodents but then spread further, hosted by and transmitted to
humans by prairie dogs [6]. The outbreaks seem to be continuing:
in 2013, a substantial rise in the number of monkeypox cases was
documented in the DRC [7]; in the Bokungu health zone with 104
suspected cases the increase was over 6-fold compared to previous
years [3].
Smallpox virus is the only Orthopoxvirus specific to humans.
Monkeypox is transmitted within its animal reservoirs and zoo-
notically, through direct contact between infected animals and
humans [1e3,6]. Human-to-human transmission is also possible
and household transmission chains as long as seven or more have
been reported [3]. The disease closely resembles smallpox: after a
mean incubation time of 8 days (4e14 days) [3], most patients first
experience fever and headache, and then, a few days later, a char-
acteristic rash appears and the fever subsides [1e3,8]. This rash
stage is often accompanied by maxillary, cervical and inguinal
lymphadenopathy not typical to smallpox. The rash is usually
confined to the trunk but can spread to the palms and soles of
the feet, occurring in a centrifugal distribution. The initial macular
lesions exhibit a papular, then vesicular and pustular appearance.
The most common differential diagnostic disease is caused by vari-
cella zoster virus (chickenpox). Chickenpox develops more rapidly,
lesions usually evolve pleomorphically in a centripetal distribution,
and are often less severe in presentation [1e3,8]. There are two
distinctive clades of the virus, West and Central African; the latter
appears to cause a more severe disease and is associated with
higher fatality rates. The majority of cases have been diagnosed
from Central Africa and only a few from West Africa, the likely
origin of the virus in the US outbreak [1,2].
Why is the disease emerging in DRC?
Previous studies suggest that there are several factors contrib-
uting to emergence: (a) waning immunity to monkeypox poxvi-
ruses in individuals previously vaccinated against smallpox; (b)http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2016.07.004
1198-743X/© 2016 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases. Puincreasing proportion of individuals born after cessation of vaccina-
tion programmes; (c) increased opportunity for human-to-human
transmission; and (d) increased exposure to animal reservoir spe-
cies [1].
The most important factor in the emergence of monkeypox is
probably the decreasing immunity to poxviruses in exposed popu-
lations. It is attributed both to waning cross-protective immunity
among those vaccinated before 1980 when mass smallpox vaccina-
tions were discontinued, and to the gradually increasing proportion
of unvaccinated individuals. Smallpox vaccination provides some
cross-protective immunity against monkeypox and is most
commonly described in unvaccinated individuals [1,2,9]. Active sur-
veillance in DRC in 1980 suggested a cross-protective rate of 85%
[1,2,9]. The immunity appears long-lasting: in a study from 2005
to 2007 <4% of patients had a history of prior smallpox vaccination
[1]. However, in the US outbreak, 6/11 of infected individuals had
received smallpox vaccine in childhood [6].
The increasing proportion of unvaccinated individuals within
the community appears to be a major contributor to the problem.
In 1980, the proportion of unvaccinated inhabitants was still low
in DRC [1,2]. During a surveillance conducted in 1981e86 a total
of 338 cases were reported. In a representative region, 35 cases
were identified with an estimated incidence of 0.72 cases/10 000
inhabitants. Twenty years later (2006e7), 760 cases were reported
in a similar regionwith an incidence of 14.42 cases/10 000 individ-
uals. These data indicate a 20-fold increase in cases, concomitantly
with a decrease in the proportion of vaccinated inhabitants from
84.7% during the first surveillance period to 24.5% during the sec-
ond. Since then, the proportion of vaccinated individuals has
further decreased and the population is therefore even more
susceptible.
A remarkable difference between smallpox and monkeypox is
that the latter not only infects humans but also has a reservoir in
animals. The disease occurs almost exclusively in small remote vil-
lages close to the tropical rainforest. Monkeypox virus can infect a
large variety of species within the mammalian taxa, ranging from
rodents to primates [2]. In particular, squirrels of the Funisciurus
and Heliociurus genera appear to be important reservoirs and likely
sources for human disease. Years of war, migration and poverty in
the DRC have increased the human penetration into jungle areas
and the use of rodents as a food source, potentially increasing the
exposure rates substantially.
Recent data suggest that human-to-human transmission has
also increased during this time [1,3]. When smallpox vaccinations
were first discontinued, only the youngest family members wereblished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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completely susceptible, allowing significant potential for an addi-
tional human-to-human transmission. During the 2013 outbreak
in DRC, frequent transmissionwas documented within households
[3,7] with a median attack rate of 50% [7]. A recent study [7]
observed that the group most often affected is school-aged boys.
Risk factors for transmission included sharing a bed or room and
using the same utensils with an infected patient. Increased trans-
mission risk associated with factors involving introduction of virus
to the oral mucosa. The researchers concluded that educating lo-
cals to limit contact with sick people is an important step in pre-
vention [7].
Monkeypox in DRC is a public health concern of increasing
magnitude due to ever greater numbers of people seeking refuge
in the rainforest and relying on bush meat as a food source. The sit-
uation is further exacerbated by waning population immunity,
inadequate living conditions, poverty, poor healthcare infrastruc-
ture and low levels of education. The outbreak in the USA [6] dem-
onstrates that spread to areas outside Africa is possible, yet it
suggests that infection would not become widespread if it enters
regions with modern healthcare systems. Smallpox vaccination
(with live vaccinia virus), despite its cross-protective efficacy
against monkeypox, is no longer an alternative due to the potential
risk for atopic and immunosuppressed individuals in the popula-
tion [2]. Even with the new-generation vaccines being developed
[2], complete eradication of the disease is unlikely because mon-
keypox has an animal reservoir. The burden of human monkeypox
infection in endemic regions may be reduced through a multi-
pronged approach, including (a) health education campaigns
addressing handling of potential animal reservoir species to pre-
vent animal-to-human transmission and (b) barrier nursing prac-
tices and isolation of acutely infected patients to prevent human-
to-human spread. Indeed, the situation calls for increasing aware-
ness and action (adequate decisions, more local medical staff in
epidemic regions, adequate sampling, surveillance, education etc.)
both from local and international authorities.
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